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Marriage (In)equality and the Historical
Legacies of Feminism
Serena Mayeri*
In Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage equality advocates won a spectacular
victory, vanquishing the material and dignitary harms that same-sex
marriage bans visited upon individuals and families. The product of a
decades-long struggle for recognition, the legalization of same-sex marriage
marked a triumph eminently worthy of celebration. But Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion also felt bittersweet to many feminists and
LGBT activists. Obergefell glorifies marriage as the apotheosis of human
fulfillment and freedom, as fundamental to full citizenship and belonging.
For those who sought sexual liberation and eschewed monogamy; who
scorned marriage as a patriarchal, heterosexist, capitalist travesty; who wished
to marry but could not; or who found personal fulfillment outside of
intimate conjugal relationships, the opinion’s rhetoric rankled. Moreover,
critics saw in Obergefell not merely an endorsement of inclusion and dignity
for same-sex couples, but an implicit ratification of the legal and social
privileges accorded to marital families and withheld from the nonmarried.1 The

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38CN9R
* Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to
Regina Austin, Nancy F. Cott, Rebecca L. Davis, Frank Goodman, Craig Konnoth, Sophia Z. Lee,
Harriet Mayeri, Melissa Murray, Rebecca A. Rix, Reva B. Siegel, and Tobias Barrington Wolff for
helpful comments and conversations about earlier drafts of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015); R. A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 53 (2015); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and the New Marriage Inequality, 104
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Rebecca Davis, Faith in Marriage, PUB. SEMINAR (July 28,
2015), http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/07/faith-in-marriage [http://perma.cc/VM98-M78V];
Timothy Stewart-Winter, The Price of Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2015, at SR1.
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Obergefell opinion also troubled some who wished to find a more precise and
generalizable doctrinal exposition of equal protection and due process
principles in the opinion’s florid but somewhat nebulous paeans to liberty and
equality.2
For a legal historian of twentieth-century feminism, Obergefell’s
valence is especially complex. This Essay measures Obergefell against two
legacies of second-wave feminist legal advocacy: the largely successful
campaign to make civil marriage formally gender-neutral, and the lesserknown, less successful struggle against laws and practices that penalized
women who lived their lives outside of marriage. Obergefell indirectly
acknowledges marriage equality’s debt to the former legacy, and utterly
disregards the latter. But the history of transformational change invoked
in Obergefell suggests the potential for marriage equality to become more than
an affirmation of marriage’s legal supremacy.
***
The feminist legacy most apparent in Obergefell is the transformation of
marriage law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion endorses wholeheartedly the
historical account articulated by feminist scholars, most prominently Nancy
Cott, since the turn of the twenty-first century.3 Marriage, on this view, is
a dynamic institution, transformed since the Founding from an inegalitarian,
racially exclusive, socially mandatory, and presumptively permanent status
by state-level reforms and federal constitutional intervention. Exhibit A in
this story of evolutionary change is the abolition of coverture and the
replacement of highly differentiated and unequal rights and duties for
husbands and wives with gender-neutral partnerships that spouses may enter
and exit voluntarily.
Historically, as a matter of formal law if not always social reality,
marriage prescribed gender-differentiated and unequal roles for husbands
and wives and the subordination of wives’ legal identity through coverture.4
The reigning marital bargain required men to provide economic support to
their wives and children; in exchange, women owed their husbands
personal services such as homemaking, caregiving, and consortium. At
2. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court Made the Right Call on Marriage
Equality—But They Did It the Wrong Way, SALON (June 29, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/
29/the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equality_%E2%80%94_but_they_did_it_t
he_wrong_way [http://perma.cc/6JSZ-WT4G].
3. See, e.g., Summary: Work of the House Judiciary Committee for the Week of
January 17–21, 2000, Vermont House of Representatives, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
baker/jan17.htm [http://perma.cc/2FZ3-43E4] (summarizing Cott’s testimony); Expert Report of
Nancy F. Cott, Ph.D., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
2009); Brief for Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–
571, 14-574).
4. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2000).
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common law, married women could not make contracts, hold property in their
own names, sue or be sued. A husband’s prerogatives included the right to
determine the family’s domicile, to chastise wayward dependents, and to
demand sexual access to his wife.
Thanks both to feminist struggle and broader economic and social
changes, many of married women’s formal legal disabilities receded over
the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Married
Women’s Property Acts, the Nineteenth Amendment, and early
antidiscrimination laws blunted the sharpest edges of coverture.5 But as late
as 1961 the Supreme Court famously declared that women’s role “as the
center of home and family life” justified exempting them from jury service,6
and the sex-differentiated laws of marriage and divorce remained on the
books in most jurisdictions.7 Laws and government policies, including the
provision of key social insurance benefits, not only assumed but encouraged
and rewarded a male breadwinner/female homemaker division of labor.8
The reigning liberal consensus followed the 1965 Moynihan Report in
recommending that black families adopt this white middle-class patriarchal
ideal or risk a dismal descent into poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.9 By
the 1970s, many policy makers worried that the “culture of pathology”
that Moynihan saw in the “Negro family” would spread across American
society if women achieved the equal employment opportunity feminists
sought.10
Feminists such as Pauli Murray and Eleanor Holmes Norton
countered with their own vision of family life, anchored by the egalitarian
marriages African American middle-class families pioneered.11 They
insisted that women’s equal opportunity in the workplace and at home
was essential, not antithetical, to racial progress, and that black women’s
strength and self-sufficiency could serve as a model for white women
constrained by restrictive sex-role expectations. A litigation campaign led
by law professor and ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote this

5. Even today, remnants of coverture persist in family law. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY,
FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, 97–132 (2014).
6. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
7. On the limitations of nineteenth-century legal reforms, see, e.g., L INDA K. K ERBER ,
N O C ONSTITUTIONAL R IGHT TO BE L ADIES (1998); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073 (1994).
8. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST
FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).
9. See Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the ‘End of Men’: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93
B.U. L. REV. 729, 730 n.10 (2013) and sources cited therein.
10. See id. at 737–38.
11. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 41–75 (2011).
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vision of egalitarian marriage into constitutional law.12 Though feminists did
not win ratification of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), they
achieved many of the ERA’s original goals through state-level reforms to
marriage and divorce law, and through federal and state constitutional rulings
that applied heightened judicial scrutiny to sex-based classifications.13 In
cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson,14 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,15 and
Califano v. Goldfarb,16 Ginsburg and her allies persuaded the Court that the
federal government could not constitutionally distinguish between husbands
and wives or between widows and widowers in the allocation of military and
Social Security benefits. By the 1980s, as a matter of formal law—though not
of social reality—feminist advocacy made marriage a gender-neutral
institution, a presumptively equal partnership of spouses with identical,
reciprocal legal rights and responsibilities.17
Obergefell invokes this feminist legacy in two related ways. First,
Justice Kennedy politely but clearly rejects respondents’ contention that
“[m]arriage . . . is by its nature a gender differentiated union of man and
woman.”18 Second, he does so by adopting historical accounts of
marriage’s evolution that foreground a progressive shift toward gender
egalitarianism. Citing the work of Nancy Cott and others, Kennedy affirms
that “[t]he history of marriage is one of both continuity and change.”19 His
foremost example is male supremacy within marriage: “Under the centuriesold doctrine of coverture,” he writes, “a married man and woman were treated
by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.”20 But, “[a]s women
gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to
understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture
was abandoned.”21 Kennedy clarifies that “[t]hese and other developments in
the institution of marriage . . . were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they
worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage
long viewed by many as essential.”22 Later, the opinion describes how
12. On Ginsburg’s litigation campaign, see id. especially at 41–185; see also Cary Franklin,
The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2010).
13. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
14. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
15. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
16. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
17. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14–16; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating a
sex-specific Alabama alimony law). Of course, legal sex neutrality did not necessarily ameliorate, and
in some cases may have aggravated, sex inequality. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain:
The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
19. Id. at 2595.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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“invidious sex-based classifications in marriage remained common through the
mid-20th century,” and how “the Court invoked equal protection principles to
invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage.”23 Citations to
Ginsburg’s brief in Reed v. Reed24 and to more than half a dozen cases she
championed as a litigator support the majority’s contention that “the Equal
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution
of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the
Constitution.”25
Kennedy’s opinion could have been far more precise in drawing the
doctrinal connections between constitutional sex discrimination law and the
constitutional imperative of same-sex marriage. Since the 1980s, scholars
and advocates have elaborated several compelling sex equality arguments
against sexual orientation discrimination generally and same-sex marriage
exclusions in particular.26 Until recently, most courts have given short shrift to
these claims.27 But Judge Marsha Berzon’s concurring opinion in the 2014
Ninth Circuit case Latta v. Otter provided a sophisticated elaboration of the
contention that same-sex marriage bans “not only classify based on sex, but
also, implicitly and explicitly, draw on ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ about
the purportedly distinctive roles and abilities of men and women.”28
Indeed, the centerpieces of Ginsburg’s 1970s litigation campaign—
Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb—had established the constitutional infirmity
of sex-based discrimination in government benefits available to spouses, as
Kennedy’s opinion acknowledged.29 Obergefell suggests that the laws
challenged in these sex equality cases were broadly analogous to same-sex
marriage bans in their violation of equal protection. The opinion does not,
however, address directly the argument that same-sex marriage bans are
23. Id. at 2603.
24. Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 69–88, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4)).
25. Id. at 2604 (citing, inter alia, Califano v. Westcott, Califano v. Goldfarb, Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, and Frontiero v. Richardson).
26. For early examples, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that laws that
discriminate based on sexual orientation “reinforce the hierarchy of males over females”); Sylvia A.
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 (arguing that
homophobia stems from the violation of gender norms, not merely disapproval of same-sex sexual
conduct, and that “legal censure of homosexuality violates constitutional norms of gender equality”).
For a review and analysis of sex discrimination arguments in marriage equality litigation, see
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex
Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087 (2014).
27. Notable exceptions include Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (adopting expert witness Nancy Cott’s historical account of coverture’s demise
wholesale and explaining marriage bans as unconstitutional discrimination based on sex as well
as sexual orientation); and Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 257–59 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (explaining how State’s justifications for prohibiting same-sex marriage “reflect
outdated sex-role stereotyping”).
28. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479–497 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
29. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional for substantially the same reason: because the sex-based
classifications they create reinforce the notion that husbands and wives perform
distinct, sex-specific roles within marriage.30 Notwithstanding the many
available doctrinal paths to calling same-sex marriage bans sex
discrimination, Kennedy’s opinion relied instead on the potent but
analytically hazy hybrid of due process and equal protection that animated
his earlier gay rights decisions.31
The omission of a sex or sexual orientation discrimination analysis in
Obergefell understandably disappointed many observers. The opinion’s
focus on the exalted status of marriage and its singular importance to human
dignity caused some to wonder whether Obergefell spoke to the larger goal
of eliminating discrimination throughout American law and society.
Moreover, without a declaration that heightened scrutiny should apply to
all sexual orientation-based classifications, it seemed possible to confine
Obergefell’s analysis to marriage and leave other injustices untouched. And
one could only imagine the restraint it must have required for Justice
Kennedy’s three female colleagues—widowed, divorced, and never
married, feminists all—to refrain from writing a single separate
concurrence.32 Even the Obergefell Court’s cryptic historical summary
obscured the centuries of feminist struggle that led “society” to “abandon”
coverture. And yet—the gender egalitarian vision of marriage invoked by
Obergefell is, unmistakably, a direct legacy of feminist legal advocacy and of
the constitutional sex equality revolution that then-lawyer and professor
Ginsburg and her allies secured.
***
Second-wave feminism has another legacy—one with a much more
tenuous constitutional foothold—that is in profound tension with
Obergefell. Even as feminists won important constitutional victories for
gender neutrality in the provision of government benefits and secured
state-level reforms to the law of marriage, they also struggled—less
visibly—against laws that penalized unmarried women. Feminists attacked
policies and practices that excluded women with nonmarital children from
employment and housing, denied them government benefits, and forced
mothers to reveal the identity of their children’s father.33 Feminists argued

30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
32. In an interview with Neil Siegel shortly after the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsburg
explained her belief that “[p]erhaps … in this case it was more powerful to have the same, single
opinion.” Samantha Lachman & Ashley Alman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Reflects on a Polarizing Term
One Month Out, HUFF. POST, July 29, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ruth-baderginsburg-tk_55b97c68e4b0b8499b18536b [http://perma.cc/94PW-JUGN].
33. See Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital
Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).
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that laws which discriminated against “illegitimate” children in fact
burdened the mothers who were primarily responsible for their care and
support.34 In law review articles, legal briefs, and personal testimonies, they
explained how and why penalties for nonmarital sex and childbearing
subordinated women, especially poor women and women of color.35 Some of
these feminists challenged marital supremacy itself, questioned the
privatization of dependence in the nuclear family, and contested the
assumption that women and children should rely on men—or “the Man”—
for economic sustenance.36 Others sought to reframe nonmarital motherhood
as a noble enterprise replete with hard work and sacrifice worthy of
recognition and celebration rather than denigration and devaluation.37
Those who challenged illegitimacy penalties and other discrimination
against unmarried women enjoyed only limited success, and fell largely
under the constitutional radar. But their arguments resonate with even
greater urgency today as an ever-widening marriage gap separates the
wealthy, educated, married haves from the increasingly impoverished
unmarried have-nots.38 Just as gender egalitarian marriage became a real
possibility for highly educated professional couples, marriage itself
increasingly seemed out of reach for many low-income women and women
of color. This growing marriage gap between rich and poor, white and black,
meant that the families most in need of now sex-neutral benefits could
not receive them. For example, when Margaret Gonzales, an unmarried
mother, tried to obtain the same insurance benefits Ginsburg and her client
Stephen Wiesenfeld had won for widowed husbands and fathers, the Supreme
Court ruled that marital status was a perfectly constitutional basis on which to
deny government benefits.39
Meanwhile, the formal gender equality that now applied to married
couples did not extend to the unmarried. For example, equitable division
of marital property at dissolution did not apply to most unmarried
cohabitants, leaving unmarried women who had made financial sacrifices to
care for home and children with nothing.40 The partial and incomplete shift

34. See Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33.
35. See, e.g., Brief for Equal Rights Advocates Inc. and ACLU as Amici Curiae at 9–11,
Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 74-1318), 1974 WL
175944.
36. See, e.g., Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried
Women and their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the
Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23 (1974); Johnnie Tillmon, Welfare is a Women’s Issue
(1972), MS. MAGAZINE, Spring 2002.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33.
39. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33.
40. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996).

2015]

MARRIAGE (IN)EQUALITY

133

toward gender egalitarian parenting within marriage did not extend to
nonmarital families, where both law and social practice vest primary rights
and responsibilities in mothers.41 A coalition of feminists and fiscal
conservatives won better child support enforcement,42 but the limited sums
low-income fathers could contribute went largely to the government,
offsetting welfare expenditures rather than benefiting poor women and their
children.43 The Supreme Court struck down much discrimination against
so-called “illegitimate” children, but never questioned the legitimacy of
discriminating against their parents, or of privileging marriage over nonmarriage more generally.44
The persistent legal privileging of marriage reinforced existing
inequalities of race, class, and gender. Tying social supports to conjugal
partnership—marital or not—meant that many poor women and women of
color suffered a double disadvantage, because they lacked partners likely to
be eligible for employment- related benefits in the first place.45 Since the
1970s, income inequality, mass incarceration, and chronic unemployment
have intersected with divergent marriage rates to widen the chasm between
highly educated women who could aspire to gender egalitarian partnerships
with affluent male peers, and their impoverished counterparts, who no longer
could count on sharing the burdens of raising children in poverty with a
partner, much less rely on a second income.46
The triumph of marriage equality has radical, transformative
potential. But it may or may not be a step toward marriage equality writ
large. Ideally, the legalization of same-sex marriage heralds a new era of
family pluralism, in which individuals and families of all kinds flourish
regardless of their formal structure. Conjugal relationships—marital and nonmarital, gay, straight, and queer—become more egalitarian, and the state
supports not only conjugal unions but other relationships of care and
mutual support.47 Rather than privileging marriage, laws and policies attempt to
sever the link between family structure and socioeconomic status.48
41. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the
Age of Equality, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33.
42. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (2003).
43. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007); Ann
Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127 (2011).
44. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Cf. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004);
LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE ADULT
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, Law That Values All Families: Beyond
(Straight and Gay) Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 85 (2009).
48. Cf. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010) (arguing that families in all their diverse forms will be unable
to flourish without government support). Such a transformation may require that individuals receive
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Many marriage skeptics fear another, bleaker scenario.49 The extension
of marriage rights to same-sex couples reinforces and entrenches the legal
privileging of marriage at the expense of individuals and families who
cannot, or do not wish to, marry.50 Instead of propelling heterosexual
couples toward more gender egalitarian partnerships, marriage pushes samesex couples to replicate gender specialization, alleviating pressure on the state
and on employers to help families integrate breadwinning and caregiving.51
Now that marriage is an option for same-sex couples, progressive legal
doctrines extending parental rights to non-biological parents are
unavailable to unmarried gay parents.52 Creative legal alternatives to
marriage, such as domestic partnership benefits, disappear.53 Individuals who
remain uncoupled, and couples who choose not to marry, are subjected to
social and economic pressure and penalty. With marriage theoretically
available to all, the legal privileging of marriage appears unproblematic, and
policy makers continue to promote marriage as a solution to poverty. The
marriage gap widens, reinforcing the intersecting inequalities of race,
gender, class, and sexual identity.
***
Obergefell does not bear the marks of feminism’s second legacy—the
campaigns against discrimination based on nonmarital status. Instead,
support by virtue of their citizenship, rather than accessing benefits through their status as family
members. Cf. Jyl Josephson, Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist Critiques of Marriage, 3
PERSP. ON POL. 269 (2005).
49. Marriage skepticism, of course, does not imply opposition to the legalization of same-sex
marriage. See Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37 (2011). On
the salutary collateral consequences of the marriage equality movement, see, for example, Cary
Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817
(2014).
50. Some marriage skeptics also fear that marriage will subject same-sex couples to
oppressive state regulation, as it has other historically subordinated groups. See, e.g., KATHERINE
FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015); Lenhardt, supra note 1.
51. For an early debate on the potential of same-sex marriage to disrupt gender role
specialization within marriage, compare Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991), with Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why
Legalizing Lesbian and Gay Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). For a sampling of more recent treatments, see Katherine
Franke, Lesbian Husbands and Gay Wives: The Gendering of Gay Divorce, THE NATION, July 3,
2013; Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721 (2012);
Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2015).
52. Cf. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and
Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437 (2012); Nancy D. Polikoff, The New
Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the Protection of Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012).
53. For various perspectives on the history of domestic partnerships and their relationship to
marriage, see, for example, ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (2012); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014); Melissa
Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went From Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291 (2013).
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Kennedy’s opinion elevates and ennobles marriage in terms that implicitly
disparage nonmarriage. He laments the fate of children with unmarried
parents as inherently difficult and demeaning.54 He provides no generalizable
theory of equality based on sex or sexual orientation that might obviously
apply to discrimination in employment, housing, or nonmarital sexual
relationships. A pessimistic reader might conclude that Obergefell invites
same-sex couples to enjoy the privileges of marital supremacy, but does little
to enhance liberty and equality outside the institution of marriage.
And yet—history also suggests that marriage skeptics should not
despair. After all, a half-century before Obergefell, the Court paid homage
to marriage as
a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.55
The case, of course, was Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice William
O. Douglas planted the seeds of a dramatic and wide-ranging constitutional
transformation in, of all places, “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.”56
Arguably, the right to privacy was Griswold’s core principle, its language
about marriage little more than a rhetorical flourish soon jettisoned in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, where Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. embraced the “right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”57 Similarly, Obergefell might come to stand
for the core principle that due process and equal protection forbid
exclusionary laws that demean and reinforce the subordinate status of
historically marginalized groups. Theoretically, at least, this principle would
apply not only to other discrimination based on sexual orientation, but also to
laws that exclude nonmarried individuals and families from obtaining the
benefits available to the married.
In the wake of a resounding victory that seemed unimaginable even a
decade ago, to assume that the constitutional die is cast, that advocates of
social change are powerless to affect Obergefell’s legacy, risks becoming a

54. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
55. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
56. Id. at 485. For doctrinal progeny of Griswold that reach far beyond marital privacy, see,
for example, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. See also id. (“It is true that, in Griswold, the right of
privacy inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity,
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals, each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup.”).
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self-fulfilling, and self-defeating, prophecy.58 After all, “society” did not
magically “abandon” coverture. Generations of feminists, often laboring
in obscurity, vanquished it, and one of them now sits on the Supreme
Court. Indeed, the very constitutional indeterminacy that scholars and
advocates understandably bemoan as a jurisprudential liability could create
opportunities for innovative constitutional and extraconstitutional arguments
that call into question marriage’s legal primacy. And if the internal
architecture of marriage can evolve not only to accommodate same-sex
relationships but to require their recognition as a matter of constitutional
law, perhaps the status of marriage as legally superior to all other family
forms need not remain frozen in time.

58. On the multivalent potential of Obergefell, see, for example, Nan D. Hunter, The
Undetermined Legacy of ‘Obergefell v. Hodges,’ THE NATION (June 29, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/the-undetermined-legacy-of-obergefell-v-hodges
[http://perma.cc/YRF2-CSVK]; Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Three Voices of Obergefell, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016).

